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CaseLaw
At the instance of one of the prosecutorial agencies of the First respondent, namely, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Crimes Commission [throughout this judgment referred to as ICPC, for short], the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (hereinafter referred to as the trial court) granted leave for the preferment of Charge No: FCT/HC/CR/44/2010 against the second and third respondents in this appeal and the appellant [the third accused person in the said charge].
When the accused persons [the second and third respondents and the appellant in this appeal] were arraigned before the trial court, the appellant herein (as third accused person) sought, by Notice of Preliminary Objection, an order of the trial court setting aside the said leave [granted as aforesaid] and a further order of the said court quashing both the charge and his arraignment. The objection was premised on the ground that, since the ICPC was a delegate of the prosecutorial powers of the Federal Attorney General, it could not sub-delegate such powers to a private prosecutor. He invoked the old maxim, delegates non potest delegare.
The trial court heard and dismissed the said objection, prompting the appellant's appeal to the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division (hereinafter, simply, referred to as "the lower court"). At the lower court, the appellant's appeal was greeted with a Preliminary Objection. In the said objection, the first respondent in this appeal challenged the competence of his appeal. The sole ground was that the appellant failed to sign his Notice of Appeal personally. In its judgement of June 20, 2012, the lower court upheld the said objection and, in consequence, struck out the appellant's appeal.
This further appeal to this court is the appellant's expression of his grievance against the outcome of his appeal to the lower court.